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the transaction had been considered instead of its form. Either of the two
methods would provide a more realistic view of the Hughes' type transac-
tion and avoid a narrow and legalistic analysis of the statutory phrase
"principal residence" which it appears that Congress never intended.
JAMES F. PASCAL
INVALID ELECTION AND INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF SUBCHAPTER S STATUS
Congress, in 1958, added Subchapter S1 to the Internal Revenue Code
in an attempt to allow "small business corporations"' to be taxed sub-
stantially as partnerships' if the shareholders so elect.' Before the special
status can be used, however, the corporation must be a small business
corporation as defined by the code5 and an initial, valid election must
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79.
2A "small business corporation" is defined by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
Note 5 infra.
'There are differences between the taxation of a partnership and that of a Subchapter
S corporation. Thus, as in the case of a regular corporation, redemption and liquidation
are taxable events; the Subchapter S corporation has the same limitations on certain deduct-
ible amounts, such as charitable contributions, as does the regular corporation; the Sub-
chapter S corporation's income retains its corporate character when distributed to share-
holders, except for capital gains, and the nature of underlying assets, in general, does not
determine the character of a gain. See Braverman, Special Subchapter S Situa-
tions-Regulations Run Rampant, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 680 (1966).
'A Senate committee report before the subchapter was enacted stated:
Your committee believes that the enactment of a provision of this type is
desirable because it permits businesses to select the form of business or-
ganization desired, without the necessity of taking into account major
differences in tax consequences.
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958-3 CuM. BULL. 1008.
The following is an overview of the mechanics of Subchapter S. There is no tax at the
corporate level (§ 1372(a)), but total taxable income of the corporation is taxed to the
individual shareholders at personal income tax rates whether the income is actually distrib-
uted or not (§ 1373). Undistributed taxable income is not taxed again when it is later
distributed. Capital gains of the corporation are passed to its shareholders, pro rata, at
capital gains rates ( 1375(a)), and corporate net operating losses are deductible by the
individual shareholders on their personal returns (§ 1374(a)). Any losses deducted by the
shareholders reduce the basis of their stock while corporate income not distributed to them
increases their basis (§ 1376).
5INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a) provides:
(a) Small businesi corporation.
For purposes of this subchapter, the term "small business corpora-
tion" means a domestic corporation which is not a member of an affiliated
group (as defined in section 1504) and which does not-
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have been made.' Although advantageous in many respects, 7 a Subchap-
ter S election can also prove disastrous. This is seen most readily when
Subchapter S status is involuntarily terminated or found to have been
void ab initio. The disqualifying event is often unintentional and unknown
to the corporation and its shareholders.
8
Involuntary termination can come about in a variety of ways. The
corporation may take some action which causes it not to be a "small
business corporation" as defined in the code.' Also, if eighty percent or
more of the corporation's income is from foreign sources,"0 twenty per-
(l) have more than 10 shareholders;
(2) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate) who
is not an individual;
(3) have a nonresident alien as a shareholder; and
(4) have more than one class of stock.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(a). Form 2553 and a statement of consent by each
shareholder are filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-2(a) (1959).
Thereafter, instead of filing a regular corporate income tax return (Form 1120), the corpo-
ration files an information return (Form 1120-S).
Once the election is validly made, it need not be renewed for subsequent years
(§ 1372(d)). Election can be voluntarily revoked if all shareholders consent (§ 1372(e)(2)),
but the'election cannot be revoked for the first taxable year in which it is effective. Also,
the revocation must be made within the first month of a taxable year to make it effective
for that taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(c) (1959). If made after the first month, the
revocation will be effective for the subsequent taxable year and years following.
7Some advantages are: limited liability with no double tax; the tax on unreasonable
accumulations does not apply; the taxpayer receives an ordinary income deduction for
corporate operating losses; and, certain benefits are made available to corporate employees
and are deductible by the corporation such as profit-sharing, qualified pension plans, group
life insurance and tax exempt death benefits without the corporation itself paying a tax.
Moreover, a Senate Committee reported:
Also, permitting shareholders to report their proportionate share of the
corporate income, in lieu of a corporate tax, will be a substantial aid to
small business. It will be primarily beneficial to those individuals who have
marginal tax rates below the [48-percent] corporate rate (or [22 percent]
rate in the case of the smaller corporations) where the earnings are lefh in
the business. Where the earnings are distributed (and are in excess of what
may properly be classified as salary payments), the benefit will extend to
individuals with somewhat higher rates since in this case a "double" tax
is removed. The provision will also be of substantial benefit to small
corporations realizing losses for a period of years where there is no way
of offsetting these losses against taxable income at the corporate level, but
the shareholders involved have other income which can be offset against
these losses.
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958-3 CUM. BULL. 1008.
$See, e.g., Milton T. Raynor, 50 T.C. 762 (1968).
'Note 5 supra.
" NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(4).
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cent or more is "passive investment income"," or if a new shareholder
fails to make the election," the corporation loses its Subchapter S status.
The special status terminates automatically when any of these things
happen, and the termination is retroactive. This means that all open years
back to the year in which the disqualifying event took place can be
analyzed by the Internal Revenue Service in assessing possible deficien-
cies, 3 which in many situations places extreme financial hardships on the
shareholders and their corporation, especially where the prohibited event
goes undetected for years." Thus, shareholders must be extremely careful
in electing and keeping their Subchapter S status. This being the case,
whether Subchapter S is accomplishing its purpose of allowing businesses
"to select the form of business organization desired, without the necessity
of taking into account major differences in tax consequences '"' is debata-
ble."6
Courts within the Fourth Judicial Circuit of the United States have
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(5). Passive investment income "means gross
receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges
of stock or securities. ... INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(5)(C).
12INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(1).
"SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e).
"Thus, the corporation will owe a corporate tax for the year in which the disqualifying
event took place and for all subsequent open years in which it had relied on its election
(§ 1372(e)(3)), even though shareholders have already paid a tax on the income. If the
income is distributed, it will not benefit the individual to file an amended return. Undistri-
buted taxable income, the tax on which has already been paid, cannot be later distributed
without the shareholders incurring taxes, at least at capital gains rates (Treas.
Reg. § 1.1375-4(a) (1959)). Deficiencies will be assessed against the shareholders where
they have deducted net operating losses of the corporation on their returns. Henderson v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965). After either a voluntary or involuntary
termination, the corporation cannot again elect Subchapter S status for five years
(§ 1372(f)). But see, Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-5 (1959).
'sNote 4 supra.
"One author has stated:
Moreover, far from simplifying the tax treatment of small business
corporations, the legislative provisions, the regulations and the court deci-
sions have grafted upon the Congressional intent a myriad of highly tech-
nical, complex and sometimes artificial requirements, the inadvertent
transgression of which can call down horrendous tax consequences upon
the heads of the unsuspecting and unwitting shareholders.
Ekman, Subchapter S: Problems of Elections and Terminations, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 475, 475-76 (1970).
Another has said:
Perhaps the greatest deterrent in electing under Subchapter S is the possi-
bility of accidental or involuntary termination of the election and a subse-
quent incurrence of double taxation.
Swietlik, Subchapter S: What Is It and How Does It Work, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 470, 492
(1961).
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decided several cases concerning different situations where it was argued
that Subchapter S elections had been involuntarily terminated. Prerequis-
ites for valid election which have been in question include the "one class
of stock requirement",' 7 the prohibition of trusts as shareholders18 and the
affiliated group prohibition. 9
THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT AND VOTING RIGHTS
A corporation's Subchapter S status will be terminated if, at the time
of election or subsequent thereto, it had outstanding more than one class
.of stock. 0 Problems under this requirement may arise in many ways,2
but the situation to be discussed here concerns only one facet, that of a
distinction in voting rights. The regulations clearly state that any differ-
ence in voting rights among the shares will disqualify the corporation. 22
'TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(4).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
IIINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
The Fourth Circuit has also decided a case concerning the timely election requirement
(@ 1372(c)), but since that case concerned only the question of who had the burden of
persuasion to show timely election, it is not included here. Frank E. Poulter, P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 67,220 (1967), affld, 397 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1968).
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-
I CuM. BULL. 219.
2 Indeed, the Tax Court decision in W.C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966) led to a rewriting
of Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g). The most common problem is that where the stockholders
make advances to the corporation calling them "debt." Often, however, no instrument
evidences the debt; there is no maturity date; no interest is stated; no payment is demanded;
principal is paid only if the business shows a profit; and the corporation's capital structure
is thin. The general rule since Gamman is that even if these advances constitute equity, they
will not be a second class of stock unless the advances are made disproportionately to actual
stock holdings. The original regulation stated, "[i]f an instrument purporting to be a debt
obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of stock." The corresponding
portion of the amended regulation provides:
But, if an issuance, redemption, sale, or other transfer of nominal stock,
or of purported debt obligations which actually represent equity capital,
results in a change in a shareholder's proportionate share of nominal stock
or his proportionate share of such purported debt, a new determination
shall be made as to whether the corporation has more than one class of
stock as of the time of such change.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 220. For cases involving the debt-
equity argument, see Brennan v. O'Donnell, 426 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1970); Henderson v.
United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965); James L. Stinnett, Jr., 54 T.C. 221
(1970); Milton T. Raynor, 50 T.C. 762 (1968); Lewis Building & Supply Co., P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 66,159 (1966).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1967) provides in part:
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not identical with
respect to the rights and interest which they convey in the control, profits,
and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered to have
1972]
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The case within the Fourth Circuit to deal with this problem was
Barnes Motor & Parts Co. v. United States.? There, voting common
was issued when the corporation was organized in 1925, but nonvoting
shares were issued in 1941. The taxpayer claimed that all the latter shares
had been treated as voting shares since 1944, and further, that the last
shares of non-voting stock were cancelled in 1964 by the issuance of
voting shares in their place. A Subchapter S election was made in 1958,
and deficiencies were assessed for the open years, 1963 through 1966. The
taxpayer contended that the, election was valid because when it was made
all shares were voting.
The court, after noting that the purpose of the one class of stock
requirement was to make allocation of undistributed income easier,24
found for the Commissioner on the ground that the last shares of non-
voting stock were not cancelled on the corporation's books until a 1967
reorganization. Therefore, the court noted, a second class of stock did
exist when the election was made."
Although a class of stock labeled non-voting had been issued, the
court implied that if the taxpayer could have proven that the shares
actually had been voting, it might have won the case. However, every
corporate decision had been unanimous, so it was impossible to say how
many shares voted. Thus, the court held that to assume the non-voting
shares had voted would be mere speculation.
2
1
Obviously, these shares may have been voting, in which case, if sub-
stance were recognized over form, the election might have been valid. It
simply was impossible for the taxpayer to prove the fact upon which its
case rested, and this caused the corporation a severe financial setback? 2
Although the court correctly applied the regulations, 28 the question may
be asked whether the regulations are justified in light of statutory policy.
more than one class of stock. Thus, a difference as to voting rights, divi-
dend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify
a corporation.
23309 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
raThe court stated:
This requirement was inserted in the statute because holders of preferred
stock have certain preferences in distribution rights over holders of com-
mon stock, voting stock is worth more than non-voting stock and the
government, if forced to account for these value differences, would have
a difficult time in allocating the proper proportion of earnings or losses
to each individual shareholder.
Id. at 301.
71The taxpayer admitted the stock was outstanding (although voting) until 1964. Id. at
302. Hence, whether they were cancelled in 1964 or 1967 makes little difference.
2ld. at 303.
27The deficiency was over $104,000. Id. at 301.
I'Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1967). Note 22 supra.
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It would seem that the statutory requirement of one class of stock is
necessary when the classes have different distribution rights but that the
regulations go too far in providing that the corporation will be disquali-
fied for issuing stock with different voting rights. If the stock has different
distribution rights as do, for example, common and preferred, the govern-
ment is going to be put to the task of allocating undistributed taxable
income to shareholders where taxed distribution per share is not equal.
However, when all stock participates equally in distributions and the only
difference in the stock is voting rights, there would seem to be no such
problem.
The court in Barnes Motor stated that voting stock is worth more
than non-voting stock, and this caused allocation problems as do different
distribution rights." This, however, does not appear to follow. As far as
the allocation of undistributed taxable income is concerned, the worth or
market value of the stock would seem irrelevant. If the distribution rights
are equal and thus every share receives the same amount upon any type
of corporate distribution, no difficulty arises in allocating income to the
shareholders since they are charged, pro rata, with that amount they
would have received had all income been distributed.
The same reasoning would seem to apply where there is a voting
agreement among shareholders all of whom hold voting shares" or
where stock has different weights in electing the board of directors. The
latter situation was presented in Pollack v. Commissioner"' where there
were four groups of stock of unequal size and each group elected one
director. The court held that since the voting rights were dispropor-
tionate, more than one class of stock had been created, and a Subchapter
S election was invalid.32
The validity of an election where there was a voting agreement was
in question in A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States3
where a voting trust consisting of all shares had been established. The
Commissioner claimed this created a new class of stock, arguing that
although a second class was not created in form, it was in substance, since
all voting power vested in the trustee while the shareholders themselves
were left with none. The court, however, said that the shareholders re-
"Note 24 supra.
3°This was the situation presented in A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United
States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967) discussed in text accompanying note 33 infra.
3'47 T.C. 92 (1966), affd, 392 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1968).
3392 F.2d at 411. The validity of the regulation was questioned in Catalina Homes,
Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 64,225 (1964), but since the case could be disposed of on other
grounds, the question was not decided.
3271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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tained all beneficial interests in their shares except the right to vote4 and
that this would cause no allocation problems. The government then
argued that a regulation 3- stated that voting agreements would give rise
to a second class of stock, but the court said that this provision was meant
to apply when two classes had been issued and not when shares with equal
rights were placed in a voting trust. The government next contended that
this situation was no different than one in which shareholders had given
an irrevocable proxy to another, and the Commissioner had specifically
held by revenue ruling 6 that irrevocable proxies would disqualify the
corporation. The court agreed that the situations were essentially the
same, but held the ruling invalid as an erroneous interpretation of the
code."
The A & N decision seems justified, although contrary to the govern-
ment's clearly stated regulation; it will be interesting to see if the reason-
ing and decision in that case are followed. However, it seems that the
court did not go far enough since it indicated that if all the shares had
not been in the voting trust, the result would have been different. The
3 The court stated: "The shareholders are still entitled to the same proportionate
benefits from the corporation as they were before the creation of the voting trust." 271 F.
Supp. at 44.
3Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1967) quoted in note 22 supra.
36Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 341 states in part:
Because of the restrictions placed upon the inactive shareholders under the
agreement in the instant case [involving an irrevocable proxy], it is held
that their rights and interests in the control of the corporation are not
identical with the rights and interests of the active shareholders. Further-
more, in the event that the outstanding stock of a corporation is subject
to any type of voting control device or arrangement, such as a pooling or
voting agreement or a charter provision granting certain shares a veto
power or the like, which has the effect of modifying the voting rights of
part of the stock so that particular shares possess disporoportionate voting
power as compared to the dividend rights or liquidation rights of those
shares and as compared to the voting, dividend and liquidation rights of
the other shares of stock of the corporation outstanding, the corporation
will be deemed to have more than one class of stock.
It is noted in Crumbley & Davis, Tax Planning for Shareholders of Subchapter S
Corporations, 26 TAX L. REV. 643 (1971) that the ruling, if valid, means that not all
shareholders would have to enter the irrevocable proxy agreement to disqualify the corpora-
tion. Thus, by implication, if only one holder gives an irrevocable proxy, the corporation
would be disqualified. This could lead to minority rule in the corporation. In any event, for
safety, any proxy should be revocable. This would not seem to disqualify the corporation.
Under the applicable statute and regulations, it is nebulous why an irrevocable proxy would
disqualify and a revocable one would not. For instance, under the government's theory,
would a revocable voting trust disqualify the corporation? If so, what is the difference
between this and a revocable proxy?
1271 F. Supp. at 45.
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theory upon which this dictum was based was that since voting stock is
worth more on the market than non-voting shares, the government would
be put to the effort of allocating income. Again, however, it is submitted
that the market value of the stock is not important in the matter of
allocation. It is distribution rights which should be equal for allocative
ease, since this will result in the equal division of income among the
shares. A voting trust of less than all the shares leads to no allocation
difficulties. Thus, the same arguments apply here as were stated in rela-
tion to Barnes Motor," although a minor difference seems to be that in
the voting agreement cases only the interpretation of the statute needs
change, while the statute" itself may have to be amended where both
voting and nonvoting stock have been issued.
THE PROBLEM OF TRUSTS AS SHAREHOLDERS
The government contends that voting trusts not only violate the one
class of stock requirement but also the prohibition of trusts as sharehold-
ers. The code" and the regulations4 disqualify a corporation from Sub-
chapter S status if a trust holds any shares. One reason for the prohibition
of trusts as shareholders seems to be that if the trust has more than one
beneficiary, there may be, in effect, more than ten "shareholders."4 Sec-
ondly, practicalities require that shareholders of a Subchapter S corpora-
tion be entities whose tax status can be readily determined for ease in
administration. 3 However, if the settlors are the beneficiaries and the
income is taxed to them,44 these problems are reduced. Further, the re-
quirement may be a vestige of the "active management rule" which states
that shareholders given the Subchapter S election should be actively en-
gaged in carrying on the business. 5
The Fourth Circuit has ruled on two cases involving regular trusts,
as distinguished from voting trusts and found violations of the prohibition
of trusts as shareholders. The first, Old Virginia Brick Co. v.
Commissioner,4 presented an interesting and somewhat unusual fact situ-
ation. Here, a testator died in 1941, leaving a large block of stock to his
wife for life with remainder to his children. The stock was to be held in
3Text accompanying note 23 supra.
31INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(4).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-I(e) (1959).
"This would violate the purpose of section 1371(a)(1).
'3Landon, An Approach to Legislative Revision of Subchapter S, 26 TAX L. REv. 799,
805 (1971).
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 671-78.
15Braverman, supra note 3.
4644 T.C. 724 (1965), affd, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966).
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trust if and when a probate court ordered the estate to be closed. All
duties of administration were completed in 1946, but the estate was not
closed by the probate court until the wife's subsequent death in 1963 after
she, as executrix, had consented to a Subchapter S election in 1959. The
probate court had never required a final settlement of the husband's
estate between 1941 and 1963. The Commissioner concluded that a testa-
mentary trust had come into effect in 1946 when all duties of administra-
tion were completed and assessed a deficiency in the corporation's taxes.
The taxpayer argued that no trust was created since under Virginia law
if a life tenant is given unrestricted power to invade corpus for her own
benefit, she is deemed to be personally possessed of the corpus.,
Of course, if the 1959 election had been by an estate rather than a
trust, it would be valid.4" The court, however, determined that for tax
purposes an estate terminates once necessary administrative duties are
completed, whether or not the executor has assumed the role of trustee
pursuant to court order.49 In Old Virginia Brick, the court noted, these
duties were completed far before the election. Further, the court accepted
the government's contention that when administration was complete a
trust sprang up, and held that the widow's power to invade was not so
unfettered so as to result in there being no trust.
Although the decision seems correct under the applicable code and
regulation sections, this corporation was prevented from making the elec-
tion, at least until the widow died and the stock was distributed outright.
The testator unknowingly" had made it impossible for the shareholders
to elect Subchapter S status, since even if the estate had been closed when
actual administrative duties were concluded, a trust would have arisen.
Such a result seems harsh when it is realized that had Subchapter S been
in effect when the testator made his will, he could have easily disposed
of his stock in such a manner that an election would not have been
precluded.5' Thus, it seems somewhat inequitable to deny this corporation
an option given to similar corporations purely for action taken by the
testator prior to the enactment of Subchapter S in 1958.
17For this proposition, the taxpayer cited Gardner v. Worrell, 201 Va. 355, 111 S.E.2d
285 (1959).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a)(2).
4Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959) provides that a trust includes all trusts subject to
subchapters D, F, H, or J. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956) under Subchapter J provides
that a trust arises when administrative duties are completed.
QThe Subchapter S option was passed by Congress seventeen years after the testator's
death.
51Thus, the stock could have been held in joint ownership, specifically bequeathed
outright, specifically bequeathed subject to a life estate, or the stock could have been made
the subject matter of a buy-sell agreement. See generally Crumbley & Davis, Tax Planning
for Shareholders of Subehapter S Corporations, 26 TAX.L. REV. 643 (1971).
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The same type of problem, that of a corporation being "locked out"
of Subchapter S treatment, arose in the Fourth Circuit decision of Fulk
& Needham, Inc. v. United States." A member of a partnership had died
in 1954, and his estate, a large part of which was his interest in the
business, passed into trust to his wife for life, remainder to his children.
The wife and children were co-executors and would become co-trustees.
In 1955 the partnership incorporated, and stock was transferred to the
Fulk estate. The estate was closed the following year, and a Subchapter
S election was subsequently made. This was obviously, in form, a testa-
mentary trust but the widow argued that the trust should be disregarded
because she had treated the shares as belonging to her.13 She had re-
ported both distributed and undistributed income in her return, and no
fidcuiary return had been filed; she alone served as spokesman for the
Fulk interests. The court rejected her argument and found the election
invalid, holding that none of these actions were inconsistent with there
being a trust."
As in Old Virginia Brick,0 this corporation had no chance to become
a Subchapter S corporation until the wife died. If the primary purpose
of the no trust requirement is to provide for administrative ease, the result
in Fulk would seem of tenuous validity since returns were regularly filed
by the wife reporting both distributed and undistributed income. Al-
though the problem of a corporation being locked out of Subchapter S
because of a testator's action prior to enactment of the statute in 1958
will lessen in the future, 6 it would seem that some relief should be given
to corporations which find themselves in this situation. Because cases
such as this would appear to be relatively rare, the election could be
allowed and allocation made on a case by case approach. The sharehold-
ers, obviously, would have the burden of persuasion to show that they,
through no action or fault of their own, were unable to make the election.
The fact that ordinary trusts are excluded as shareholders in the Sub-
chapter S corporation is both logical and necessary." The election was
added to benefit small businesses, although no limits were put on the
amounts of capital or assets. Using the trust device could lead to easy
52411 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1969), affg 288 F. Supp. 39 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
mHowever, it would seem that if the trust were disregarded, the terms of the will which
set up the trust would be violated.
."411 F.2d at 1407.
-Note 46 and accompanying text supra.
,As years go by, fewer and fewer testators will have died before Subchapter S went
into effect.
"This is true where the ordinary trust is not one in which trust income is taxed to the
settlor rather than to the trust itself or the beneficiaries other than settlors. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 671-78. The "settlor trust" presents a situation analogous to the voting trust.
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circumvention, in substance, of the ten shareholder requirement, thus
nullifying the one requirement upon size of the corporation. Further,
unless the trust were one in which income was definitely taxed to the
settlor, complications could arise concerning to whom undistributed taxa-
ble income should be taxed. Therefore, it would seem best to keep the
no trust requirement but modify the regulations for flexibility where, for
example, the corporation is "locked out" of the election.
Voting trusts have caused difficulties under the no trusts as sharehold-
ers requirement as they have under the one class of stock requirement.
Although the Fourth Circuit has not decided any cases where it was
claimed that a voting trust had been established thus violating the
prohibition of trusts as shareholders under section 1371(a)(2), voting
trusts, as distinguished from the traditional private trusts discussed
above, present a clear situation where administrative difficulties would
not seem to exist and the election should be allowed. Yet the regulations' s
explicitly state the fact that where stock is held by a voting trust, no
election can be made. This regulation is not based on a violation of the
one class of stock requirement but was put forth under section 1371(a)(2)
which states that only individuals or estates can be shareholders of Sub-
chapter S corporations. The regulation has not gone uncriticized, how-
ever, for in Catalina Homes, Inc.59 the government contended that the
voting trust violated the prohibition of trusts as shareholders. The Tax
Court questioned the validity of the regulation, indicating that it was not
sure the measure represented a reasonable interpretation of the statute
and the intent of Congress.6" The regulation"' was subsequently held in-
valid in A & N Furniture & Applicance Co. v. United States"2 where, as
noted earlier, 3 the court also stated that a voting trust did not violate
the one class of stock requirement. To the contention that the voting trust
violated the prohibition of trusts as shareholders, the court said that it
could not conceive of any reason why a voting trust should even be
considered a shareholder.64
The A & N decision on this question seems logically correct. In the
voting trust situation, income is taxed to the settlor, and it would seem
that no allocation problems should arise. It will probably be true, how-
ever, that any time the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation do
create a voting trust, litigation will arise since the government will con-
IsTreas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959). See also Rev. Rul. 226, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 341.
"P-H Tax Ct. Mem. If 64,225 (1964).
6ONote 4 supra.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959).
62271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
"Text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
64271 F. Supp. at 46.
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tend that the stock is not held by an individual or estate as section
1371(a)(2) requires. It would seem that the voting trust, for purposes of
election under Subchapter S, should be treated separately from other
trusts, and it is suggested that the regulations be amended to so provide.
THE AFFILIATED GROUP PROHIBITION
A further means by which a corporation may lose its Subchapter S
status is by becoming a member of an affiliated group, in which case it
would no longer be a "small business corporation.""5 The affiliated group
prohibition seems to have caused few problems, and cases are rare.6 This
was, however, an additional problem raised in the Barnes Motor case."
Here, a Subchapter S election was made in 1958 after the corporation
had created a subsidiary in 1955. The taxpayer corporation owned all
stock in the subsidiary until 1961 when sixty percent was transferred to
shareholders of the parent, thus terminating the affiliation. 8 The corpora-
tion created another subsidiary in 1964 and kept 350 shares while the
subsidiary's manager owned the remaining 100.69 This subsidiary was
liquidated in 1965, and deficiencies were assessed for 1963 through 1966.
The taxpayer claimed that since the prohibited affiliation was terminated
Irr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a), quoted in note 5 supra, defines a "small business
corporation." The corporation must not be a member of an affiliated group as defined by
section 1504(a) which provides as follows:
(a) Definition of "affiliated group."
As used in this chapter, the term "affiliated group" means one or
more chains of includible corporations connected through stock ownership
with a common parent corporation which is an includible corporation if-
(I) Stock possessing at least 80 percent of the voting power
of all classes of stock and at least 80 percent of each class of
the nonvoting stock of each of the includible corporations (ex-
cept the common parent corporation) is owned directly by one
or more of the other includible corporations; and
(2) The common parent corporation owns directly stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the voting power of all classes
of stock and at least 80 percent of each class of the nonvoting
stock of at least one of the other includible corporations.
As used in this subsection, the term "stock" does not include nonvoting stock which is
limited and preferred as to dividends.
"For another case dealing with the affiliated group prohibition in a Subchapter S
setting, see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1253 (10th Cir. 1971).
rext accompanying note 23 supra.
"Barnes Motor & Parts Co. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 298, 303 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
The affiliation would cease after the transfer of stock to shareholders because less than 80%
would be owned by the parent.
"Id. at 300. Thus, this would be a prohibited affiliation as the parent owned 87.5
percent of the subsidiary. Note 65 supra.
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with the first subsidiary before the years in question, the government
should not be allowed to question the returns nine years after the election
and six years after the disqualifying event was ended. The court easily
disposed of this contention by pointing out that since the election was
invalid when made, it would not be valid for subsequent years, and held
further that the second subsidiary was also a disqualifying violation.
There seem to be two reasons for the prohibition of affiliated groups.
First, the Subchapter S election was meant for relatively small, uncompli-
cated businesses, not those with more complex capital structures and tax
problems. It purports to allow the proprietorship or partnership to have
advantages such as limited liability without worry over tax consequences.
The prohibition, therefore, would seem to help limit the size of the total
business organization. Second, allocation of income could be extremely
difficult when the affiliated group chose Subchapter S taxation, at least
where the subsidiary was not completely owned by the parent. For exam-
ple, where there are minority shareholders of the subsidiary, it would have
to be determined with how much of the group's income they would be
charged. Furthermore, more shareholder consents would be necessary in
order to elect Subchapter S status, and it is not clear who would be
required to file these. If individual shareholders of the subsidiary were not
required to file, a loophole in the number of shareholders requirement
would be opened. The allocation becomes less difficult, however, when
the subsidiary is wholly owned, and it has been suggested that section
1371(d) be amended to provide that in this situation, the group would
qualify for the election .7 This would not appear to be the best proposal
for it would seem to defeat one of the underlying bases of the Subchapter
S election which is to give relatively small businesses many advantages
of the corporate form without attendant tax disadvantages. Allowing
affiliated groups to elect Subchapter S would cater to larger and more
complex organizations whose operations resemble those of the traditional
corporation rather than those of a small partnership or proprietorship.
Further, the effects of prohibition can be circumvented somewhat even
now by distributing the stock of what would be a subsidiary within the
family or group of persons holding the parent's stock.
7
1
It is obvious that Subchapter S can provide the small business with
70
1f taxpayer's contention had been upheld the deficiency, because of the violation by
the second subsidiary, would be only for 1964 through 1966 instead of 1963 through 1966.
This would have saved taxpayer $24,987.69 out of a total deficiency assessment of
$104,651.91. Id. at 301.
71See, e.g., Landon, An Approach to Legislative Revision of Subchapter S, 26 TAx L.
REv. 799, 804 (1971).
"In other words, two distinct corporations would be established, and both would,
through the common shareholders, elect Subchapter S status.
